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The Tentative Case Against Flexibility
in Commercial Law
Omri Ben-Shahart
"The state enacts an image of order that-a model for its be-
holders, in and of itself--orders society."-Clifford Geertz'
Well-rooted in modern commercial law is the idea that the
law and the obligations that it enforces should reflect the empiri-
cal reality of the relationship between the contracting parties.
The Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") champions this tradition
by viewing the performance practices formed among the parties
throughout their interaction as a primary source for interpreting
and supplementing their explicit contracts. The generous recogni-
tion of waiver and modifications, as well as the binding force the
Code accords to course of performance, course of dealings, and
customary trade usages, effectively permits unwritten commer-
cial practices to vary and to erode explicit contractual provisions.
This approach, which allows the reality of the relationship to
override rigid allocations of rights and duties in the bargain, has
long been celebrated for its nonformalist spirit. It is the sub-
stance of the parties' agreement that the law seeks to trace, not a
formal historical manifestation of it. Formalism-the separation
of law from life, of the meaning of the text from its context-is
rejected in favor of pragmatism.2 Obligations are derived not
merely by logical deduction from the language of the bargain, but
through an inductive process, resting on scattered empirical ob-
servations.3 The Code recognizes that the rights and duties of
contracting parties can be derived not solely from specified
t Assistant Professor of Law and Economics, University of Michigan Law School. I am
grateful to Ian Ayres, Lisa Bernstein, Hanoch Dagan, Ronald Mann, James J. White, and
Eyal Zamir for helpful comments.
' Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 30
(Basic Books 1983).
' See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 16, 40-41 (Har-
vard 1990), which suggests that formalism "spares the lawyer or judge from messy en-
counters with empirical reality." See also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509,
538 (1988) (defining formalism as adherence to the formal text so as to constrict the choice
of the judges).
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 126 (Clarendon 1961) (defining formalism as
the separation of the rule's meaning from case-specific context).
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authoritative static forms, most notably the text of the bargain,
but also from the dynamic, legally unformulated, fact patterns of
common life. In fact, due to this approach the Code is often per-
ceived as the principal and unique body of enacted law to have
arisen from the realist philosophy.4
The Code's underlying jurisprudential theory of immanent
law has recently been subject to direct as well as implicit criti-
cism. One branch of criticism has argued that the business norms
that the Code seeks to find and incorporate into an agreement are
not the optimal provisions to govern commercial relationships.5
Another branch of criticism has challenged the ability of courts to
accurately identify the immanent business norms and incorporate
them into legal commands.' Yet a third line of criticism takes is-
sue with the mere existence of objectively verifiable customary
practices.7 This Article follows a different strand of criticism. It
does not examine the intrinsic nature of commercial practices,
but instead analyzes the ways that the Code's incorporation of
these practices into binding law shapes and interferes with their
emergence.'
The analysis here rests on the premise that justifications for
or objections to formalist adjudication ought to be derived not
from the aesthetic needs of the legal system but from its effect on
the individuals whose behavior the system aims to regulate. It is
" Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 Stan L Rev 621, 623 (1975) (asserting that Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential preferences
strongly influenced the UCC); John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look
at the Code, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev 341, 343 (1988) (arguing that the Code is the first and
perhaps the unique legal realist statute).
' See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
Va L Rev 757, 763-64 (1995) (arguing that optimal commercial practices may not emerge
because of network externalities); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms,
144 U Pa L Rev 1697, 1724 (1996) (contending that commercial norms are not likely to be
efficient and thus should not be enforced by law); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the
Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J Legal Stud 377, 407-08 (1997) (asserting that the
process underlying the evolution of commercial practices generates inefficient norms).
These critiques explore the inefficiency of business norms. For a critique of the inadequate
moral content of immanent law, see Danzig, 27 Stan L Rev at 627-31 (cited in note 4).
' See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analy-
sis of the Interaction Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal L Rev 261, 275-
76 (1985) (arguing that the process of identifying relationship-specific practices is error-
prone); Gedid, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev at 353-54 (cited in note 4) (arguing that courts ignore
the incorporation methodology).
" This is the view proposed by Lisa Bernstein in her contribution to this Symposium.
See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis ofArticle 2's Incorporation Strategy:
A Preliminary Study, 66 U Chi L Rev 710 (1999).
' See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev 1765, 1808-11 (1996) (criticizing
the Code's immanent law approach as fostering more rigid norms).
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not the certainty and predictability of the law that strictly mat-
ter,9 but the effect of the law on the reality of common life.10
Formalism in contract law can be defended, according to this
approach, only if the patterns of conduct it brings about are supe-
rior, according to some normative criterion, to those inspired by a
nonformalist approach. Thus, for example, the inquiry into
whether a formalist adherence to the parol evidence rule in con-
tract law is desirable cannot end by referring to the parties' need
for security or to the law's concern for reduced litigation and more
reliable evidence.1 These are aesthetic legal values that matter to
lawyers and judges more than to contracting parties. 2 In fact, if
the aesthetically pleasing substantive norms lead to inefficient or
unfair outcomes, better outcomes might arise if these norms are
unstable or unpredictable. Thus, the inquiry should examine the
link between the formalism of the doctrine and its ability to ad-
vance a principal aim of contract law-promoting mutually bene-
ficial exchanges."3
Accordingly, the focus of the analysis here is the way the
Code's immanent law approach shapes the incentives of con-
tracting parties in establishing their business practices. These
practices are not fixed or exogenous, but are potentially influ-
enced by the role that the law assigns to them. Specifically, the
Schauer, 97 Yale L J at 547-48 (cited in note 2), can be understood to endorse the
justification for formalism that rests on these aesthetic virtues of the system, that is, on
the relation between formalism and certainty.
" One example of the conflict between aesthetic and substantive goals of the law is the
resolution of uncertainty over causation. It has been demonstrated that the "preponder-
ance of probabilities" rule of evidence, which conditions liability on the probability of the
defendant causing harm exceeding 50 percent, minimizes error costs. In an important
sense, the preponderance of evidence rule best promotes the aesthetic virtue of "truth": it
brings the adjudicated outcome closest to the factually correct outcome (the one arrived at
under perfect information). See, for example, David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance
of Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation,
1982 Am Bar Found Res J 487, 514. However, this aesthetic rule is not optimal with re-
spect to the goal of deterrence. An alternative rule-the proportional liability regime-
creates better incentives for precaution. See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of
Accident Law 116-17 (Harvard 1987) (demonstrating the substantive superiority of the
proportional liability rule and confronting it with the error costs minimization attained by
the preponderance of evidence rule).
" See, for example, John D. Calamari and Jospeh M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Pa-
rol Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 Ind L J 333, 341 (1967)
(arguing that under the Williston view, the parol evidence rule is a rule of form intended
to secure transactions and reduce litigation and perjury).
" See, for example, Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 17 (Yale 1977) (assert-
ing that lawyers prefer a formalistic approach to law that promotes stability, certainty,
and predictability).
" On the link between the parol evidence rule and the aims of the contracting parties,
see Marvin A. Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts 86-87
(Foundation 1990).
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analysis begins from the insight14 that practices of mutual flexi-
bility and leniency might be deterred if courts treat these prac-
tices as amendments to, or variations of, the parties' explicit con-
tract. Parties will require strict adherence to the formal provi-
sions of the contract if they expect that their leniency today will
bind them in the future, potentially eroding their express rights.
This ex ante "rigidity effect" might frustrate the Code's objective
of encouraging flexibility. Like a scientist who by mere examina-
tion of her subjects interferes with and biases their behavioral
patterns,'5 the law's attempt to mimic the life conditions of the
commercial relationship influences the formation of that reality. 6
This Article contrasts the two conjectured effects arising
from the Code's immanent law approach. It examines whether
the drafters of the Code were correct in overlooking the rigidity
effect and expecting their approach to promote the flexibility of
legal obligations.'7 Or, are more recent critiques correct in claim-
ing that the rigidity effect dominates? 8 Does the Code's approach
implement more or less flexibility in commercial life? 9
This Article offers two layers of analysis of this issue. The
first layer-the "benchmark" claim-is that the Code's immanent
law approach does not affect the magnitude of flexibility in com-
mercial relationships. The flexibility effect and the rigidity effect
arising from doctrines like course of performance and waiver gen-
erally balance out. The same amount of rigidity-the parties'
strict adherence to the express provisions of contract-will result
regardless of the law's willingness to alter rights and duties ac-
cording to past practices that conflict with express provisions.
" This insight was proposed in Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1781-82 (cited in note 8)
(presenting industry-drafted trade rules and decisions that reject the Code's course of per-
formance and course of dealing doctrines).
" The standard metaphor is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which, in rough
terms, states that the mere act of observing and measuring a phenomenon disrupts it. See,
for example, Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time 53-61 (Bantam 1988).
", See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 Harv L Rev 1, 23 (1989) (arguing that courts must take
account of how the very process ofjudging shapes the materials being judged and that the
results courts announce reshape the nature of what the courts initially undertook to re-
view).
" UCC § 2-208 cmt 3 (ALI 1996) (advocating waiver of contractual provisions when
deference to parties' past practice is necessary "to preserve the flexible character of com-
mercial contracts").
"See Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1808-11 (cited in note 8).
" Most commentators seem to believe that doctrines like waiver and course of per-
formance increase the flexibility of the relationships. See, for example, E. Allan Farn-
sworth, Contracts § 8.5 at 588 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1990) (contending that "the concept of
waiver permits more flexibility in dealing with the conduct of the parties at the perform-
ance stage").
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This "benchmark" claim-that the legal rule is irrelevant--chal-
lenges the validity of both opposing conjectures regarding the ef-
fect of the Code's search for immanent business norms. Whether
the law embodies a formalist or nonformalist approach in inte-
grating past practices, that is, whether it gives authority to text
or to context, the same final allocation of rights will emerge.
The second layer of analysis relaxes the assumptions under-
lying the theoretical derivation of the irrelevance claim. This ex-
ploration suggests that the Code's incorporation of past practices
can indeed, and in a subtle manner, affect the flexibility of the
contracting relationship. Explicit rights and duties might erode in
different degrees, depending on the law's doctrines for incorpo-
rating past practice. However, it is not the substantive legal rules
per se that influence the degree to which explicit rights and du-
ties may erode. Instead, factors like imperfect information and
the structure of enforcement mechanisms-those that are as-
sumed away in the derivation of the irrelevance claim-account
for the relevance of the immanent law approach and generate a
societal preference for one regime over another. Assessing the ef-
fect of these factors, the analysis suggests that the type of flexi-
bility that the Code potentially promotes is one that often makes
contractual parties worse off.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I sets forth the
common justifications for using the parties' past practices in de-
termining their rights and duties under a contract and then de-
tails how the Code directs the courts to use past practices in de-
ciding cases. It examines various techniques that embody the
Code's endorsement of flexibility and its quest for enforcing rela-
tionship-specific practices. Part II develops the irrelevance in-
sight, that is, that the Code's past practice doctrines have no ef-
fect on the ultimate degree of flexibility in the relationship.'0 Part
III relaxes the assumptions underlying the irrelevance claim and
explores various factors that can affect both the amount of flexi-
bility exercised by the parties and the normative value of that
flexibility. Part IV concludes with some methodological claims
concerning the contribution of the irrelevance insight to the study
of formalism in other areas of the law.
0 The analysis in Part II is based on the model presented in Omri Ben-Shahar, Rights
Eroding By Past Breach, 1 Am L & Econ Rev (forthcoming 1999) (examining various legal
and extra legal norms that incorporate an erosion mechanism and demonstrating their ir-
relevance).
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I. THE CODE'S ENDORSEMENT OF FLEXIBILITY
A. The Role of Past Practices
It is well recognized that legal relationships between con-
tracting parties are governed not merely by the explicit provi-
sions included in their contract, but also by various default rules
and mandatory directives provided by contract law. It is equally
well understood that distinguishing between commands that are
explicitly provided for by the parties and commands that are sup-
plied by legal default rules is an important element of policing
the relationship. Explicit provisions are supreme: they should
normally govern when in conflict with legally supplied gap fill-
ers .
21
The hierarchy among explicit provisions and legally supplied
default provisions is blurred when the legally supplied provisions
are based upon an aggregation of past practices. Unlike standard
default arrangements that are offered on the basis of some un-
derlying social end (say, on a normative thesis of how they best
serve the interests of the parties and society), provisions that re-
flect past practices emerge from a statistical exploration of the
"life conditions" of the relationship.22 Such provisions are not a
"creature of mere reason," but a "fact-pattern of common life."'
Founded on these positive grounds, past practices can be viewed
as a hybrid type of provision. They are provided both by law and
by the parties. They are not pure explicit provisions, since the
parties did not incorporate them into the text of their drafted con-
tract. And they are not pure default rules, because the parties ac-
tually indicated, by conduct, their understanding of the content of
these provisions and their intention to be governed by them.
24
If the source of validity of past practices is attributed to the
actual, rather than the legally implied, intentions of the parties,
the normative status of these practices is elevated. For one, if a
"1 See UCC § 1-102(3) (stating that Code-provided default arrangements may be var-
ied by agreement). See also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy .f Contract Interpretation
and Supplementation, 97 Colum L Rev 1710, 1715-19, 1771-80 (1997), for an account of, as
well as a powerful challenge to, this conventional hierarchy.
' Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 122 (Little,
Brown 1960) (endorsing the view that law should reflect the realities of common life). See
also Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Commercial Transactions: Principles and Policies
17-18 (Foundation 2d ed 1991) (arguing that Llewellyn believed courts should interpret
contracts by deducing moral norms from the customs of merchants).
' Llewellyn, Common Law at 122 (cited in note 22). See generally Gedid, 29 Wm &
Mary L Rev at 359-71 (cited in note 4).
"See Thompson v Fairleigh, 300 Ky 144, 187 SW2d 812, 816 (1945) ("There is an old
saying of an English judge: 'Show me what the parties did under the contract and I will
show you what the contract means.").
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past practice is in conflict with a legally provided default rule, the
past practice will naturally govern. The past practice indicates
the parties' will, thus no gap exists and no room remains for
statutory gap fillers.' Furthermore, and perhaps surprisingly, if
a past practice is in conflict with an explicit contractual provision,
the past practice will often be allowed to vary and trump the ex-
press terms.'
The superiority of past practices over express contractual
terms can be rationalized in several ways. First, past practices
may be the clearest indication of what the parties actually in-
tended, an intention they somehow failed to articulate explicitly
and with sufficient precision in the text of the contractY Accord-
ing to this view, a past practice is not a means to override or de-
viate from contractual provisions but is merely a medium for in-
terpreting or supplementing the express terms. The parties, when
drafting a provision, could not have meant anything but those
obligations that they have in fact practiced.'m Thus, if there is an
" James J. White and Robert S. Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 3-3 at 92-93
(West 4th ed 1995) (arguing that past practices import additional terms into a contract
where the contract was silent and therefore supersede any default rules). See, for exam-
ple, UCC § 2-316(3Xc) ("[Ain implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade."); Standard Structure Steel Co v
Bethlehem Steel Corp, 597 F Supp 164, 185-86 (D Conn 1984) (holding that course of
dealing excluded the implied warranty of merchantability).
UCC § 2-208(3) ("[Clourse of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or
modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance."); id § 2-208 cmt 3.
See White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code §1-6 at 37-38 (cited in note 25)
("This section not only can operate to fill gaps in agreements or to interpret agreements.
... It can also modify or waive the express terms of an agreement.... [Clourts sometimes
say that course of performance 'controls' and thus alters the express term."). See also Ore-
gon Bank v Nautilus Crane & Equipment Corp, 68 Or App 131, 683 P2d 95, 101 (1984)
(holding that a seller may waive by course of performance a disclaimer of warranty); Mar-
golin v Franklin, 132 I1 App 2d 527, 270 NE2d 140, 142-43 (1971) (ruling that a party
who accepts late payments cannot insist on strict compliance with the contract's explicit
time provisions). For the opposite approach, see V-M Corp v Bernard Distributing Co, 447
F2d 864, 868 (7th Cir 1971) (holding that when the express terms of the contract cannot
be harmonized with the past practice, the express terms shall control).
1 UCC § 1-205(3) looks to a course of dealing or usage of trade to "give particular
meaning" to terms of an agreement; UCO § 2-202 looks to past practices to "explain" the
agreement. As White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code §1-6 at 38 (cited in note
25), explain: "[C]ourse of performance is relevant under section 2-208(1) to determine the
'meaning of the agreement' in the first place. When the section is so used, the apparent in-
consistency between an express term and course of performance can melt away." For a
representative Code case, see Dreyfus Co, Inc v Royster Co, 501 F Supp 1169, 1172 (E D
Ark 1980) (holding that trade usage may be relied upon to resolve conflict between express
terms in contract). This rationale can also be traced in non-Code cases. See, for example,
Noell v American Design, Inc, Profit Sharing Plan, 764 F2d 827, 832-33 (11th Cir 1985)
(using course of performance to interpret employee benefit plans that were "ambiguous").
"UCC § 2-208 cmt 1 explains: "The parties themselves know best what they have
meant by their words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indi-
The University of Chicago Law Review
apparent conflict between an express term and a past practice,
the express term should be interpreted in a manner that con-
forms with the life of the relationship, so there will be no sub-
stantive conflict.
This explanation may be persuasive in situations where the
contract's language is sufficiently vague to tolerate an interpreta-
tion conforming with-rather than contrasting with-the actual
practice. However, this explanation does not adequately explain
the de facto superiority that past practices often enjoy over un-
ambiguously conflicting express terms. An alternative explana-
tion would expand the notion of the parties' intention from a
static to a dynamic conception. According to this explanation, at
the time of drafting the contract, the parties indeed intended to
be governed by the provisions that they expressly articulated,
loud and clear. However, as their relationship progressed, they
"agreed" to adjust their mutual obligations to meet changing re-
alities and needs. Although this ad hoc agreement is inferred
from the parties' conduct, it reflects their subjective-rather than
imputed-intention.' Thus, the parties drafted the explicit terms
only as a benchmark, to be applied so long as circumstances did
not dictate otherwise. If their practices deviated from the express
provisions, this must imply that a change of circumstances oc-
curred and that the parties have agreed to modify their respec-
tive obligations.' The conduct of the parties speaks louder than
their words. In fact, by integrating the parties' past practices into
the relationship, the law favors the parties' ex post intention over
their ex ante, "historical" intention and thereby saves the parties
the transaction cost of formally redrafting the bargain.
These two explanations for the superiority of past practice
over explicit contractual terms are embedded in one conception or
another of the parties' intention. These explanations thus deny,
in a sense, the potential existence of a conflict between "form"
and "substance." "Form"-the text of the contractual provision-
cation of what that meaning was." Similarly, UCC § 2-202 cmt 2 identifies the past prac-
tice doctrines as means for assuring that "the true understanding of the parties as to the
agreement may be reached." See also Goetz and Scott, 73 Cal L Rev at 275 (cited in note 6)
(claiming that the parties' actions are the best indication of the meaning of the contractual
formulation); Zamir, 97 Colum L Rev at 1734 (cited in note 21) (same).
An ongoing practice can indicate the parties' subjective intention to trump the ex-
press terms only if the parties are consciously aware of the practice. Accordingly, UCC
§ 2-208(1) requires actual knowledge of the nature of the performance. However, UCC § 1-
205(3) makes binding any practice or usage of which the parties "should be" aware, even if
one of the parties is not actually aware of it (emphasis added).
See Zamir, 97 Colum L Rev at 1765-67 (cited in note 21) (arguing that course of con-
duct reflects parties' modified intentions in light of changed circumstances).
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is accorded an elastic definition so as to encapsulate the sub-
stance, or the "situation sense," of the deal.
A third rationale for the superiority of past practices offers a
different perspective. A past practice that conflicts with the terms
of the contract will become binding not because both parties are
deemed to have agreed to it, but because one of the parties has
reasonably relied on it. It might very well be that one of the par-
ties never intended or agreed to be governed by this practice, but
even against this party's conflicting intention, the practice suc-
ceeds in overriding the explicit provision (as long as one of the
parties relied on the practice).
Just as reliance plays a role in creating contractual obliga-
tions (by, say, promissory estoppel), reliance can be key in deter-
mining when the original contractual obligation has been re-
placed by a modified obligation. In order to protect the reliance
interest of a party who incurs opportunity costs while reasonably
expecting an ongoing practice to persist, the law allows the on-
going practice to override the explicit provisions." That is, when a
party allows a conflicting practice to go unchallenged even though
she has the right to enforce the explicit provisions of the contract,
she creates an expectation on the part of the other party that she
will not enforce the explicit provisions prospectively. Thus, the
acquiescing party will be barred-estopped-from frustrating this
expectation by arbitrarily deciding to enforce the original prom-
ise. This idea, that silence (that is, lack of enforcement) implies
acceptance, is well-rooted in a broad spectrum of legal traditions32
and reemerges in this context of commercial law.
B. Past Practice Doctrines in the Code
Through several of its provisions, the Code accords past prac-
tices priority over explicit terms. The Code endorses the view that
the legally binding agreement includes all the practices that have
evolved between the parties.' Although it formally states that
the express terms of the agreement control course of performance
This approach often underlies the doctrine of waiver. According to UCC § 2-209(5), a
party can retract a waiver unless the waiver was relied upon. See Ford Motor Credit Co v
Waters, 273 S2d 96, 100 (Fla App 1973) (finding that parties have the right to rely on the
continuation of a practice).
A more general treatment of this phenomenon is offered in Omri Ben-Shahar and
Avery Katz, Reliance on the Non-Enforcement of Entitlements (1999) (unpublished manu-
script on file with U Chi L Rev).
UCO § 1-201(3) defines "agreement" to mean "the bargain of the parties in fact...
or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or
course of performance."
1999]
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and course of dealing,' it allows the opposite to occur. When the
express provisions are set forth in a writing that is intended by
the parties to be the final expression of their agreement, these
commands may nevertheless be supplemented-de facto contra-
dicted-by course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of
trade."
First, although the parol evidence rule traditionally pre-
vented the parties fiom introducing evidence of oral understand-
ing that preceded the final written expression of the contract, the
Code allows such evidence to "explain" or "supplement" the ex-
press terms. Even an express 'merger clause," stating that the
writing constitutes the entire agreement between the parties,
may not bar the introduction of conflicting information through
evidence of past practices." Unless the parties carefully negate
them in writing, their past practices "become an element of the
meaning of the words used."'
Second, in a long line of cases courts have held that course of
performance can trump conflicting terms in the contract." Fol-
lowing the Code's instruction that terms inconsistent with the
course of performance shall be deemed waived or modified,39
courts have altered the explicit terms in a wide variety of circum-
stances. For example, when a seller provides warranty services
beyond the period to which the contract explicitly limited war-
ranty, the seller is held to have waived the time limitation, and
the warranty is extended in conformity with the past practices.0
Similarly, when a seller receives a series of late or otherwise non-
conforming installment payments, the seller has effectively
waived her right to demand strictly complying payments in the
future.4 Furthermore, course of performance is often deemed to
UCC §§ 2-208(2), 1-205(4).
Id § 2-202(a).
See Seibel v Layne & Bowler, Inc, 56 Or App 387, 641 P2d 668, 671 (1982) (holding
that evidence of parties' true intention is allowed to override merger clause because "it
would be unconscionable to permit an inconspicuous merger clause to exclude evidence of
an express oral warranty").
UCC § 2-202 cmt 2.
See cases cited in White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code §1-6 at 37-38
(cited in note 25).
UCC § 2-208(3); id cmt 3 ("Where it is difficult to determine whether a particular act
merely sheds light on the meaning of the agreement or represents a waiver of a term of
the agreement, the preference is in favor of 'waiver' whenever such construction . . . is
needed to preserve the flexible character of commercial contracts.").
See, for example, Nautilus Crane, 683 P2d at 101 (holding that a fixed-term express
warranty may be extended, by course of performance, to a longer-term implied warranty,
even in the presence of an explicit disclaimer of implied warranties).
See, for example, Westinghouse Credit Corp v Shelton, 645 F2d 869, 873-74 (10th Cir
1981) (finding that seller's acceptance of late payments is legally sufficient grounds to
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waive explicit contractual provisions, even in the presence of "an-
tiwaiver' clauses in the contract. Although such clauses express a
clear intention to the contrary, most courts read "antiwaiver"
provisions as themselves subject to waiver or modification by
course of performance. 2
Even more harsh, and somewhat less recurrent, are judicial
determinations that course of dealing is superior to the express
terms of an agreement. Here, a practice that had persisted prior
to the contract, and that the contract's explicit language appears
to exclude, is made binding. If the rightholder acquiesced to viola-
tions of her explicit right throughout her past dealings with the
violator (or, potentially, with others), she might lose the power to
enforce this right even though she explicitly asserted it anew in
the most recent contract. Most often, this approach is applied
with respect to delivery dates. By accepting late performance as a
matter of practice, a promisee is deemed to waive the right to
punctual performance, even if that right is drafted into a new
contract." But courts have been encouraged to extend this ap-
proach with respect to other internal norms generated within the
relationship.' In contrast to the power of course of performance
to alter explicit terms, however, courts are more restrained in al-
lowing course of dealing to trump express agreements. 5 Course of
dealings will more likely control express terms if a party to the
waive the sales contraces antiwaiver clause).
" See, for example, id at 874 ("The [factfinder's] question is whether [the seller], by ac-
cepting late payments as it did, waived its right to strictly enforce not only the contract's
time terms, but also the 'anti-waiver' clause itself."); Knoxville Rod & Bearing, Inc v Bettis
Corp, 672 SW2d 203, 207 (Ten App 1983) (stating general rule that a promise not to
compete may be waived by a conflicting course of conduct, even in the presence of a "no
oral modification" clause); Van Bibber v Norris, 404 NE2d 1365, 1374 (Ind App 1980)
(holding that in light of conflicting practice, "it would be unconscionable to give effect to
non-waiver language"); Cobb v Midwest Recovery Bureau Co, 295 NW2d 232, 236 (Minn
1980) (noting that a majority of states that have considered the issue permit a finding of
waiver, even in the face of an unambiguous nonwaiver clause).
See, for example, Brownie's Army & Navy Store, Inc v E.J. Burke, Jr, Inc, 72 AD2d
171, 424 NYS2d 800, 803 (1980) (finding that seller who accepted late payments and did
not charge interest is not entitled to payment of interest on delinquent accounts).
" See Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 Loyola LA L
Rev 789, 794, 804-05 (1993) (arguing that course of dealing should apply not only to pro-
vide terms of the agreement, but also norms such as cooperation and adjustment).
' See White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 3-3 at 95 (cited at note 25)
(contending that courts do not always find that course of dealing prevails over express
terms).
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contract relies on the course of dealings" or if the express terms
have not been carefully deliberated."
Interestingly, under the Code parties have limited power to
opt out of the 'Jurisdiction" of their own past practice. As pointed
out, courts subject the contract's antiwaiver clauses to the same
erosion that the contract's substantive allocations of rights and
duties suffer. This adjudicative approach is also evidenced by
courts' disrespect for "no oral modification" clauses. Although the
Code provides that a written agreement barring oral modification
cannot be orally modified,48 it nevertheless allows such written
terms to be waived by means of a conflicting, unwritten practice. 9
Thus, it appears, not only are past practices stronger than ordi-
nary default rules and explicit provisions, but this hierarchy is
mandatory: namely, the parties cannot easily opt out of it."
II. THE FORMATION OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
A. Endogeneity of Practices
One of the prominent premises underlying the Code's adjudi-
cative approach is that commercial practices exist out there in
the world and that a good adjudicator's role is merely to identify
See Celebrity, Inc v Kemper, 96 NM 508, 632 P2d 743, 744 (1981) (finding that ex-
press terms usually control course of dealings, unless a party reasonably relies on course
of dealings).
See Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co v Pemberton, 196 Pa Super 180, 173
A2d 780, 784 (1961) (holding that trade custom and course of dealing override the express
provision if the provision was not conspicuous); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich L Rev 1815, 1860 (1991) (inter-
preting Provident Tradesmen's to hold that express terms overrule course of dealing only if
the parties deliberated carefully when drafting them). But see American Machine & Tool
Co, Inc v Strite-Anderson Manufacturing Co, 353 NW2d 592, 597 (Minn App 1984) (hold-
ing that evidence of trade usage and course of dealing was admissible even if the contract
at issue was not ambiguous).
4UCO § 2-209(2) ("A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission ex-
cept by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded.").
Id § 2-209(4) ("[Aln attempt at modification or rescission . . . can operate as a
waiver."). See also Wisconsin Knife Works v National Metal Crafters, 781 F2d 1280, 1286-
89 (7th Cir 1986) (holding that a conflicting practice can operate as waiver when relied
upon, even though the contract provided that it could not be orally modified).
0 See Beth A.'Eisler, Modification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Section 2-209 Reconsidered, 57 Tenn L Rev 401, 418 (1990) ("The weight of author-
ity gives no legal effect to [a 'no oral modification'] clause that prohibits waivers when the
party's conduct evidences a waiver."); Battista v Savings Bank of Baltimore, 67 Md App
257, 507 A2d 203, 209 (1986) (holding that a course of conduct inconsistent with prompt
payment provisions can operate as waiver of those provisions, as well as waiver of the
nonwaiver clause). However, some courts and commentators believe that parties can opt
out of the course of performance rule by explicitly stating so in the contract. See, for ex-
ample, Don Tracy, Disclaiming and Limiting Liability for Commercial Damages, 83 Com-
mercial L J 8, 19-20 (1978).
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them. These practices, as they evolve between the parties, repre-
sent a "condition of time and place" that courts, if sufficiently
perceptive, should recognize." The law's effort to trace these life
conditions and document them-to make them part of the en-
forceable agreement-does not in itself, it is believed, influence
their formation or their substance.
A challenge to this view can be traced to a recent article by
Lisa Bernstein.52 Trying to explain her empirical observation that
trade association rules reject the past practices doctrines, Bern-
stein raises the possibility that parties who interact in the
shadow of a legal system that binds them to their ad hoc practices
will be less likely to engage in flexible adjustments of their ex-
press contractual obligations. She argues that as a result of the
Code's adjudicative approach, parties exhibit less overall flexibil-
ity and less responsiveness to changed circumstances. Commer-
cial practices that would otherwise have emerged are suppressed.
Paradoxically, the spirit of flexibility embedded in the Code re-
sults in rigidity among contractual parties.
More generally, the choice between formalist versus nonfor-
malist rules of contract formation has an ex ante effect that is of-
ten overlooked. It is ordinarily believed that utilizing formalist
rules of contract formation could upset the law's ability to imple-
ment the true substance of the parties' deal. Thus, for example,
strict application of rules like the statute of frauds, the parol evi-
dence rule, the plain meaning rule, and the mirror-image rule-
all doctrines that rely on forms to determine substance-is
believed to diminish the parties' ability to demonstrate the true
substance of the deal and the extent to which it differed from its
form.' But this view ignores the ex ante effect of formalist
adjudication on the parties' incentives when drafting their
bargain. The greater the courts' allegiance to the writing, the
more careful will the parties be in drafting the written document.
The form of the bargain is not exogenous: rather, it is tailored in
light of the weight that the courts will likely assign to it. The con-
s Llewellyn, Common Law at 122 (cited in note 22).
52 Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1808 (cited in note 8).
See, for example, Pacific Gas & Electric Co v GW Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co, 69
Cal 2d 33, 69 Cal Rptr 561, 442 P2d 641, 644 (1968) (holding that the plain meaning rule,
which limits the determination of the meaning of a written contract to its four corners,
conflicts with the goal of enforcing the true intention of the parties); Gardner Zemke Co v
Dunham Bush Inc, 115 NM 260, 850 P2d 319, 322 (1993) (acknowledging that the common
law mirror-image rule ignores modern commercial realities and fails to implement the ac-
tual deal agreed upon between the parties).
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tent of the text is endogenously determined by the courts' will-
ingness to peek beyond the text.'
In the context of the past practices doctrines, the reason that
course of performance and course of dealing rules shape, and not
merely reflect, the parties' course of performance and dealing can
be rephrased in the following terms. Ordinarily, when the prom-
isee faces a situation in which the promisor is trying to perform
an obligation in a nonconforming manner, the promisee weighs
the value of insisting on strict compliance with the express terms
against the cost of such insistence. If courts do not apply the
flexibility-promoting doctrines, the value of enforcement is the in-
cremental benefit from perfect conformity. Measured against the
cost of enforcement (an expensive legal action or damage to the
goodwill within the relationship, perhaps even to her own reputa-
tion), the promisee will demand strict compliance only if the non-
conformity is sufficiently severe. However, when courts apply the
Code's past practices doctrines-so that nonconformity can also
lead to the erosion of the promisee's express rights in future
rounds of dealing-the promisee has more at stake. In these cir-
cumstances, enforcing strict compliance not only restores the cur-
rent, one-time, perhaps minuscule value of full performance, but
also protects the potentially greater value the promisee stands to
gain from these provisions in the future. Having more to lose
from leniency, the promisee will be less lenient. Therefore, a
practice of nonconformity is less likely to be acquiesced to, and
thus to emerge under the Code's eroding rights regime. The
analysis in the next Part takes a closer look at and develops this
intuition.
B. A Benchmark Observation: The Irrelevance of the Past
Practices Rules
1. The flexibility and rigidity effects.
The Code's course of performance and course of dealing rules
generate two simultaneous effects. The first, the "flexibility ef-
fect" (or the "erosion effect"), is what the drafters of the Code in-
tended. Namely, by allowing the parties' past practices rather
than the explicit terms of their contract to govern, the law facili-
" This insight was invoked, in the same context, to critique the Code's nonformalist
approach to the battle of the forms and to propose a return to the more formalist applica-
tion of the mirror-image rule. See Douglas G. Baird and Robert Weisberg, Rules, Stan-
dards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 Va L Rev 1217, 1257
(1982) (asserting that strict adherence to the mirror-image rule in the battle of the forms
would force parties to reduce the gaps between their competing forms).
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tates flexible and continuous adjustments of the enforceable obli-
gations.' Hence, to the extent that the actual practices the par-
ties follow are indeed changing and adjusting over time to meet
their changing needs, so will the terms of the agreement.' By
contrast, in a more formalist legal regime (one that does not in-
corporate past practices into the agreement), this flexibility effect
does not arise and legal obligations remain unchanged.
The second effect, the "rigidity effect" (or the "antierosion ef-
fect"), is the one originally identified by Bernstein. 7 Namely, by
allowing past practices to govern, the parties' behavior will be-
come less flexible and their practices will more often and more
closely adhere to the formal terms of the contract. To avoid the
erosion of their bargained-for contractual rights, parties will ex-
hibit greater vigor in objecting to deviant practices. In a legal re-
gime that ignores past practices, by contrast, parties will be less
strict in protecting their contractual entitlements and the rigidity
effect will not arise. Notice that the rigidity effect makes the ex-
plicit contractual entitlement more secure. Having more at stake,
the entitlement holder has a more credible threat to sue and de-
ter violations of her rights. Thus, if the entitlement holder has an
interest in securing her rights against breach, she may paradoxi-
cally be better off under a regime that allows erosion.
Thus, the Code's past practices doctrines generate two con-
flicting effects. The flexibility effect introduces greater flexibility,
whereas the rigidity effect forces less flexibility. In order to
evaluate the success of the Code's adjudicative approach in pro-
moting flexibility, we need to compare the relative magnitude of
these two effects. The original drafters of the Code did not ac-
knowledge the rigidity effect; therefore, their anticipation that
the Code would lead to more flexibility in contractual obligations
may have been naive. By the same token, while Bernstein's
analysis stresses the rigidity effect, it does not acknowledge the
simultaneously occurring flexibility effect. While she rightfully
argues that parties will be less lenient in allowing deviations
from the express contract, she overlooks the fact that some devia-
See Part I.B.
Many commentators have endorsed this effect. See, for example, Goetz and Scott, 73
Cal L Rev at 279 (cited in note 6) (arguing that consideration of course of performance re-
duces incompleteness errors); Speidel, 26 Loyola LA L Rev at 794 (cited in note 44) (sug-
gesting that the parties' course of dealing creates norms that become binding terms of the
contract); Zamir, 97 Colum L Rev at 1765-67 (cited in note 21) (same); Robert A. Hillman,
Court Adjustment of Long-Tern Contracts: An Analysis under Modern Contract Law, 1987
Duke L J 1, 5-9 (arguing that courts should adjust contractual provisions according to
course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage).
"See Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1808 (cited in note 8).
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tions may nevertheless occur, subsequently giving rise to binding
deviant practices. Thus, these two conflicting intuitions need to
be examined together. Can we determine in the abstract which of
the two effects dominates? Can we confirm Bernstein's conjecture
that the rigidity effect is the dominant force, thus leading to a re-
duced overall level of flexibility?
The analysis below demonstrates that the two effects, the
flexibility effect and the rigidity effect, generally balance out.
They operate in identical magnitudes-one increases flexibility
and one diminishes it--and thus the law does not affect the over-
all amount of flexibility. Whether or not the law makes use of
erosion rules, like course of performance and its ilk, the overall
deviation from the explicit provisions of the contract will be the
same. In particular, the overall degree of flexibility that will oc-
cur under the Code's course of performance rule will be no more
and no less than the degree of flexibility under the opposite, more
formalist regime that ignores past practices and adheres exclu-
sively to the express contractual terms. In fact, this "neutrality"
(or irrelevance) feature will be shown to hold for a broad range of
erosion rules. It applies irrespective of the "mechanics" of erosion,
namely, how fast a past practice becomes binding. Thus, for ex-
ample, the neutrality is maintained regardless of whether the law
requires one, two, or more instances of nonconforming conduct to
recognize a valid, binding practice.'
2. An example.
Consider the following simplifying example. According to the
explicit terms of a sales contract, a seller who has delivered a
good to a buyer is entitled to receive two monthly payments of
$100 each, due the first day of the month, for a total sum of $200.
If a payment is delayed, the delay imposes a cost on the seller of
$1 per day. When a delay occurs, the seller can "enforce" her con-
tractual right, but each instance of enforcement costs the seller
$10." The nature of the enforcement costs will be discussed be-
" Course of performance under UCC § 2-208(1) crystallizes after "repeated occasions
for performance." Obviously, one instance of deviation from the contractual terms does not
suffice. See id cmt 4 ("A single occasion of conduct does not fall within the language of this
section.'). In a well-known case, a court held that two acts could be enough to generate
course of performance. See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co v Shell Oil Co, Inc, 664 F2d 772,
794 (9th Cir 1981).
' It is assumed that only one party is in a position to breach. In an ongoing relation-
ship it might often be the case that both parties are continuously performing their mutual
duties. Thus, the analysis below captures situations in which one party (the "seller") per-
forms a larger discrete chunk of her duties upfront. Common situations in which this
might occur are lending contracts, leases, and installment sales.
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low. For our present needs, assume that there exists some legally
effective measure that costs $10 and assures the seller that the
full value of a timely payment of $100 will be paid. (That is, in
the event of enforcement, the seller gets a remedy equivalent to
expectation damages, which equals the $100 value plus the cost
of delay.) However, the $10 enforcement measure is only effective
in one period. Each month, if a violation or delay occurs, the
seller must incur the cost anew in order to enforce her rights.
a) Behavior under the no-erosion regime. Consider now the
behavior that results under the two competing legal regimes. Un-
der the no-erosion regime-the regime that ignores past practices
in determining the parties' obligations-the buyer is required to
pay $100 on the first of each month. In particular, this is his obli-
gation in the "late" periods (the second month), even if in "early"
periods (the first month) the seller acquiesced to a late payment.
If in the first month the seller accepted the payment with a ten
day delay, the no-erosion legal regime ignores this "practice" and
requires strict compliance with the explicit terms of the contract
in the second month. The buyer, whose cash-flow may be tight, or
who for any one of a number of reasons may wish to get away
with a late payment, will delay each installment payment to the
maximum extent so as not to trigger enforcement. Under this re-
gime, if the delay exceeds ten days (that is, if it imposes a cost of
more than $10 on the seller), the buyer expects the seller to en-
force the contractual right. In such a case, the buyer will end up
compensating the seller for the cost of delay ($10), and the buyer
will also bear his own cost of enforcement." If, however, the delay
does not exceed ten days, and thus exposes the seller to a loss no
greater than $10, the seller will have no incentive to spend the
$10 enforcement cost and will instead acquiesce to the delay.
Hence, the rationally opportunistic buyer will breach to the
maximum extent so as not to trigger enforcement and thus will
make each monthly payment with a ten day delay. The seller will
,o If enforcement is exercised through litigation, the analysis of this example assumes
no fee shifting. However, similar observations would apply under a fee shifting regime.
There, each party's "litigation cost" is the combined cost of litigation for both parties, mul-
tiplied by the probability that this party will be the losing party and will have to reim-
burse the other. For a technical presentation of the equivalence among litigation finance
regimes, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Informa-
tion, 15 Rand J Econ 404 (1984). Similarly, enforcement might result in a successful set-
tlement without incurring fll litigation costs. In that case, the cost of enforcement in the
example would stand for the cost of settlement and the gap between the settlement
amount and the expected judgment. See, for example, Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E. Spier,
Settlement of Litigation, in Peter Newman, ed, 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Econom-
ics and the Law 442, 444 (Stockton 1998).
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receive her two contractual payments of $100, each with a ten
day delay, for a combined delay of twenty days. Thus, the net
value the seller receives from the contract will be $200 - $20 =
$180. This amount equals her formal contractual right minus the
cumulative cost of delay. Notice that the cost of delay equals the
seller's cost of enforcement.
b) Behavior under the course of performance rule. First, we
need to specify the "rate of erosion" that arises from the course of
performance rule. For simplicity of presentation and without loss
of generality, assume that a course of performance arises after a
single instance of breach. 1 That is, if the first payment were de-
layed and paid, say, on the tenth of the month (and no enforce-
ment followed), the buyer would no longer be required to make
the second payment on the first of the month. Instead, in the ab-
sence of enforcement, the late first payment creates a new con-
tractual right: the buyer can make the second payment on the
tenth of the month.
Under this hypothetical erosion regime, what pattern of
payments will emerge? The key difference between the parties'
behavior under the two regimes is the incentives relating to the
first payment. Under the no-erosion rule the seller will acquiesce
to a ten day payment delay. Under the course of performance
rule, in contrast, the seller will not acquiesce to the same delay,
because if she acquiesces, a legally binding course of performance
will then crystallize and will reduce the value of the second pay-
ment. For if the buyer is only obligated to deliver the second
payment on the tenth of the month (due to the course of perform-
ance created by the first payment), the seller will be worse off
than if the buyer was still obligated to make payment on the first
of the month. While the seller incurs the same cost ($10) in the
first month whether she enforces her rights or acquiesces to the
ten day delay of the first payment, she saves more than $10 in
delay costs if she enforces her rights. The benefit from enforce-
ment equals the immediate $10 remedy, applicable to the current
payment, plus the value of preventing the creation of a course of
performance that would exacerbate the delay cost in the second
month. That is, the added stake associated with the erosion that
may potentially occur makes the seller a more motivated enforcer
against delay and will in turn-when anticipated by the buyer-
lead to a short delay.
" Admittedly, most of the Code's erosion rules require more than one instance of
breach for a binding practice to develop. See note 58. However, one instance of deviation
could be grounds for recognizing waiver. See Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.13 at 536 (cited in
note 19).
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To establish the exact magnitude of delay that the seller will
permit, we need to reason backwards in time. The seller's incen-
tives to enforce at early stages depend on her expectation of the
effects of any erosion of her contractual rights on the value she
may receive in later stages. Thus, we need to identify decision
patterns in the second month and then proceed to determine
what will happen in the first month. When the time comes for the
second payment to be made, we already know that, given the
seller's enforcement cost of $10, the buyer will exercise a ten day
delay relative to his legal duty. That legal duty, however, depends
on past practice. If, as a result of a delay in the first payment, the
buyer's duty has already eroded, the ten day delay will accrue
with respect to his new duty. Thus, if the course of performance
involves, say, a five day delay, the seller will choose to incur the
$10 enforcement cost only when the delay is ten days longer than
the buyer's legal duty requires. That is, the seller will not pursue
enforcement unless the delay exceeds fifteen days. The net value
of the damages the seller receives-after subtracting the $10 cost
of enforcement-will be positive only if the buyer delays at least
fifteen days.
Moving to the first payment, the seller's incentives to enforce
are the following. The seller anticipates that if she fails to enforce
against any delay, her right for a timely second payment will
erode. Having this added motivation to enforce, her "threat" to
enforce is more credible and thus limits the amount of delay the
opportunistic buyer will exercise. The seller will no longer allow
the buyer to delay the first payment by ten days, because the to-
tal cost of such a ten day delay will now equal $20: the $10 delay
cost in the first month plus the $10 cost of erosion in the second
month (the second payment will be delayed an additional ten
days, for a total delay of twenty days in the second month). As a
result of the potential erosion, the $10 enforcement cost will now
be worthwhile. In other words, given her enforcement cost, the
maximum first payment delay that the seller will permit is one
that inflicts on her a total cost (in periods one and two) of $10.
This will be the case when the delay is five days. If the seller al-
lows a five day delay, she incurs a $5 delay cost in the first month
and an additional $5 cost as a result of the erosion created by the
new course of performance. The total cost is $10. Thus, the first
payment will be exactly five days late, establishing a course of
performance allowing a five day delay. On the basis of this eroded
duty, the buyer will make the second payment with a fifteen day
delay.
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In sum, under the version of the course of performance rule
examined here, the seller will receive two payments, each with a
different length of delay. The first payment will be five days late
and the second will be fifteen days late, for a combined delay of
twenty days. The net value the seller receives will be $200 - $20
=$180.
c) Comparison of the two regimes. We can now examine the
different patterns of performance arising under the competing le-
gal regimes. The no-erosion regime leads to two identical delay
periods of ten days each, whereas the erosion regime leads to de-
lay periods of five days and fifteen days in the two respective
months. Under the erosion regime, the first payment exhibits a
five day delay, instead of a ten day delay (as under the no-erosion
regime). This divergence is a result of the "rigidity effect," that is,
an enhanced incentive to enforce compliance in the early period.
Conversely, under the erosion regime the second payment exhib-
its a fifteen day delay, instead of a ten day delay (as under the
no-erosion regime). This divergence is a result of the "flexibiity
effect," that is, the emergence of a new, albeit more restrained,
course of performance after the first month.2
Hence, the two regimes differ with respect to the profile of
values received by the promisee across time: ($90, $90) under the
no-erosion regime versus ($95, $85) under the erosion regime.
But, importantly, the two regimes generate the same amount of
overall value enjoyed by the promisee, $180. This amount reflects
the explicit value promised in the contract, $200, less the cost of
delay, which exactly equals the cumulative cost of enforcement,
$20.
Notice, though, that in this example the breached-against
party (the seller) does not incur any enforcement costs. The de-
gree of nonconformity is set so as not to trigger enforcement. The
cumulative cost of enforcement, $20, is extracted from the prom-
isee as rent through delay, without the promisee spending any-
thing in actual enforcement measures. Obviously, this feature of
the equilibrium is related to simplifying informational assump-
tions, which will be relaxed in Part III. However, the appearance
of flexibility should not confuse us: it may not necessarily be a
product of cooperation, but rather the result of a delicate balance
achieved in the presence of credible threats.
' The course of performance is more restrained when the law assigns it binding
authority. It is a five day delay "practice," as opposed to a ten day delay "practice," that
arises when the "practice" has no binding force, as under the no-erosion regime.
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3. The generality of the irrelevance claim and its prima
facie implications.
The result illustrated above exemplifies a far more general
property: the irrelevance of the erosion rules with respect to the
overall value of the entitlement at stake. This result is robust and
reaches beyond contract law. I have shown elsewhereP that the
irrelevance claim applies within contracts with longer horizons
and for all relevant versions of the course of performance rule, re-
gardless of how many instances of breach are needed to establish
a course of performance.' It applies, in general, to almost all ero-
sion or flexibility-promoting mechanisms that the law embraces.'
For example, the doctrine of adverse possession in property law is
a variant of a past practices doctrine: the ongoing practice of pos-
Ben-Shahar, 1 Am L & Econ Rev (forthcoming 1999) (cited in note 20).
To illustrate, consider a contract specifying three, instead of two, monthly payments
of $100 each and a course of performance rule that requires two instances of breach. That
is, if only the first payment is late, the buyer is still legally required to pay the second and
third payments on time; but if both the first and the second payments are late, a course of
performance emerges and the buyer is permitted to be late on the third payment. If, say,
the first two payments were both paid with a ten day delay, the buyer's duty is to pay the
third payment on the tenth of the month. If, however, the first two payments were each
paid with a different delay period, say ten days and five days, the course of performance
equals the "common denominator" of the two delays, that is, the minimum extent of delay
that both payments exhibited: five days.
Under the no-erosion regime, each of the three payments will be paid with a ten day
delay, for similar reasons to those explained in the two-payment example. Under the
course of performance regime, if the first payment were paid ten days late, the seller will
not acquiesce to the same second-payment delay. If she acquiesces to another ten day de-
lay, a legally binding course of performance will then crystallize, which will reduce the
value of the third payment for the seller. Enforcing against a ten day delay of the second
payment costs the seller $10 but yields her the immediate $10 remedy plus the prevention
of the loss that will accrue when the time comes for the third payment. Thus, as long as
the first payment delay was at least five days, the second payment will be delayed exactly
five days. A delay longer than five days will justify the seller's spending the $10 enforce-
ment cost, as it will yield an immediate benefit greater than $5 and will prevent an ero-
sion with a value of at least $5. This conduct will establish a course of performance al-
lowing a five day delay, which implies that the third payment will be paid with a fifteen
day delay (in this period, the seller has no added incentive to enforce, so the buyer will
compound the legally permitted delay-five days-with the maximally tolerable ten day
delay). Finally, the delay of the first payment will be ten days. As this delay does not lead
to immediate erosion, the seller will have no added incentive to enforce. Even though she
anticipates that this delay will be followed by an additional delay in the second install-
ment, it is only the second delay that raises the stakes for her, not the first; therefore, she
will acquiesce to the same magnitude of delay that she would have under a no-erosion re-
gime. In sum, under this version of the course of performance rule, the seller will receive
three payments that will be ten, five, and fifteen days late, respectively, for a combined
delay of thirty days. This is identical to the combined delay under the no-erosion regime
and again the value of the contract equals the formal right ($300) minus the enforcement
costs ($30).
"Part IH.B below will draw the limits of the irrelevance claim and show to which ero-
sion rules it does not apply.
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session of another's property is accorded binding power and
erodes the original owner's entitlement. The claim rests on the
following intuition: In trying to promote flexible adjustments of
contractual obligations by mimicking past practices, the Code's
flexibility provisions alter the behavior of the parties. Specifi-
cally, the flexibility provisions increase the incentives of the
rightholder to adhere more strictly to her contractual rights and
to object more vigorously to violations of these rights. However,
even with the enhanced motivation to enforce, the rightholder
will be willing to overlook some violations, albeit only moderate
(restrained) ones. These restrained violations will eventually
emerge as the ongoing practice between the parties and will
modify their contractual obligations. The more attentive the law
is to past practices, the less lenient the parties will be and the
less likely they will allow deviant practices to emerge. The par-
ties' rigidity arises directly from the law's flexibility; therefore the
degree of the parties' rigidity precisely reflects the degree of the
law's flexibility. Hence, regardless of the legal regime, the
rightholder will enjoy the same value from the contract. This
amount will equal the difference between the formal entitlement
and the enforcement costs. Enforcement costs alone, and not the
substantive erosion mechanism, dictate the value of the contrac-
tual right.
The irrelevance proposition also holds when the seller dis-
counts future payments. In that case, the erosion rule can be
shown to be irrelevant with respect to the discounted value of the
entitlement at stake. To illustrate the irrelevance when the par-
ties discount future payments, consider the example discussed
above and assume that the seller's discount rate is 2/3 (that is,
the seller values $1 paid in the second period as $0.67 paid in*the
first period). Under the no-erosion rule, the seller will get two
identical payments, each ten days late (worth $90 each), for a dis-
counted value of $90 + (2/3) x $90 = $150. Under the course of
performance rule, the discounting will diminish the rigidity effect
that is driving the seller. While enforcement is still instrumental
in preventing the erosion of the next period's right, this erosion is
less costly when the seller discounts future payments. Specifi-
cally, given her enforcement cost of $10, the seller will refrain
from enforcement as long as the actual first-month payment is
worth $94, that is, issued no more than six days late (instead of
five days, when no discounting occurs). Such first month payment
costs the seller $6 in the first month, and a discounted value of
(2/3) x $6 in the second month, totaling $10, which exactly equals
the seller's enforcement cost. This six day delay will establish a
[66:781
Case Against Flexibility
new course of performance, and the subsequent second month
delivery will be sixteen days late, worth $84. The discounted
value of such a stream of payments is $94 + (2/3) x $84 = $150,
exactly equal to the discounted value of the different stream of
payments under the no-erosion regime. Under both regimes, the
value received equals the discounted value promised ($100 + (2/3)
x $100 = $166.67) minus the discounted value of enforcement
costs ($10 + (2/3) x $10 = $16.67). Generally, as the above exam-
ples indicate, the only two factors that affect the value eventually
received by the seller are the expressly promised value and the
cost of enforcing this promise. The de facto value is always the
promised value net of enforcement costs. As long as the erosion
rules do not themselves affect the costliness of enforcement, the
amount of deviation from the formal entitlement will be inde-
pendent of the laws flexibility rule.
Throughout the analysis, I assumed that violations of rights
occur only as a result of opportunistic behavior. When he chisels,
the promisor, who received the goods up front, merely exploits the
promisee's enforcement costs. Clearly, there are also "good faith"
reasons for breach. Within an ongoing relationship, changes in
circumstances might make deviations from the formal promise
cost-justified. The analysis above applies equally well to this ex-
panded view of the motivation to breach. An unanticipated
change of circumstances might legitimate a requested and mutu-
ally agreed-upon modification of the contract but not legitimate a
unilateral decision to breach. A promisee who might acquiesce to
a good faith request for modification might nevertheless object to
a nonnegotiated breach. In setting aside the normative assess-
ment of the desirability of breach-whether or not it is efficient or
in good faith-the analysis aimed its focus exclusively on the in-
centives of the promisee to safeguard her rights and to force only
bargained-for modifications. These incentives emerge any time
the modification is not bargained for, regardless of the motivation
of the breacher. In particular, flexibility-oriented legal rules in-
crease the rigidity of the rightholder, generating the described
offsetting effects.
Before further exploring and qualifying this benchmark in-
sight, it is worth pausing to reflect on the implications that the
irrelevance claim-if true-might have on the Code's flexibility
objective. The irrelevance claim could potentially shed new light
on the debate over flexibility versus formalism in commercial law.
For one, it casts doubt on the ability of the Code's adjudicative
approach to promote its underlying goals. The past practices doc-
trines do not, in themselves, lead to a greater degree of flexibility
1999]
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in commercial relations. On the other hand, the irrelevance claim
qualifies the more extreme recent criticism of the Code's ap-
proach. In contrast to Bernstein's claim that the Code's approach
leads to more rigidity in commercial relations," this analysis im-
plies that the past practices doctrines do not in fact lead to
greater rigidity. The no-erosion rules that Bernstein advocates,
and that many merchant courts endorse, result in the same over-
all degree of deviation from the original contract as erosion rules
do.
Further, it appears that the actual content of the past prac-
tices rule might not matter. Whether one, two, or more actions
are required by law to establish a binding course of performance,
this factor alone will not affect the value of performance ren-
dered." Intuitively, the faster the past practice becomes binding,
the more driven the rightholder will be to enforce against con-
flicting practices. If, at the extreme, one deviation from the ex-
plicit promise would suffice to establish a course of performance,
the rightholder will exercise greater vigor in challenging immedi-
ately any single deviation. The greater flexibility that a fast rate
of erosion embodies is exactly balanced by the greater rigidity
that the rightholder manifests; the net effect is zero. Thus, this
analysis would appear to diminish the importance of legal deter-
minations as to what sets of facts should be construed as imma-
nent business norms.
Another prima facie conclusion that can be drawn from this
analysis is that when entering into a contract the parties should
not care whether they are governed by a course of performance
regime or a no-erosion regime. The tendency of courts to identify
nonenforcement as waiver of the explicit right will not affect the
value the parties expect to get from the relationship. It should be
emphasized that this irrelevance-of-the-law claim is strictly un-
related to bargaining-around-the-law irrelevance claims, A la the
Coase Theorem. That is, erosion rules are irrelevant not because
parties cooperatively bargain their way out of them, but because
of the unique structure of enforcement incentives that these rules
create." Even if parties do not redesign their agreement to
Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1808 (cited in note 8).
See notes 63-64.
It should be highlighted, in this context, that the Coase Theorem is both broader
and narrower than the irrelevance claim presented in this Article. It is broader because it
potentially applies to all legal rules, whereas the claim here applies only to a narrow
branch of rules that incorporate the eroding rights property. At the same time, the Coase
Theorem is narrower since it is only an efficiency-regarding claim (that is, distributive ef-
fects will vary with the legal rule), whereas the claim here is that erosion rules are irrele-
vant with respect to both their efficiency and distributive effects.
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stipulate their own erosion regime, and instead accede to the le-
gal rule, the value of their contractual rights will not be affected.
In fact, if, as one might plausibly assume, the parties care about
the overall value received and not the precise profile of pay-
ments-for example, if they do not care whether the value ac-
crues in several identically delayed payments or in several differ-
ently delayed payments-then they will be indifferent with re-
spect to the legal regime.
The irrelevance of the legal regime to the overall value re-
ceived from a contract thus implies that we should expect the
same price to be paid up front, irrespective of the possibility of
erosion. More importantly, this suggests that rational parties
would exhibit their alleged indifference by not opting out of the
current erosion regime. That is, the neutrality of erosion rules
obviates the need to redesign the contract in the shadow of these
rules. This implies, for example, that "no-waiver" clauses that are
intended to explicitly opt out of the Code's erosion rules will not
be drafted into contracts.
This last implication is obviously counterfactual. When
drawing their contracts, parties very often include a "no-waiver"
provision. 9 This is puzzling, not only because-as we saw
above-courts will not necessarily respect these provisions, but
mainly because promisees should not assign any value to such
provisions and should not waste drafting effort and bargaining
capital on securing them. To reconcile the gap between the theo-
retical proposition and the observed behavior, and to reexamine
the validity of these prima facie implications, the analysis in Part
III will explore various factors that might break down the irrele-
vance argument.
" See, for example, Thomas S. Hemmendinger, Hillman on Commercial Loan Docu-
mentation 137 (Practicing Law Institute 4th ed 1994), which provides examples of stan-
dard loan contracts that include terms like:
B. No Waiver by Lender. Notwithstanding any course of dealing between the parties,
neither failure nor delay on the part of Lender to exercise any right, power, or privi-
lege hereunder shall operate as waiver thereof...
C. No Oral Modifications. Notwithstanding any course of dealing between the par-
ties, no amendment, modification, rescission, waiver or release of any provision of
this Agreement shall be effective unless the same shall be in writing and signed by
the parties hereto.
Id at 108. Similar provisions appear in the standard security agreement, id at 213, the
standard guaranty agreement, id at 384, and the like.
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III. THE TENTATIVE CASE AGAINST FLEXIBILITY
The analysis in Part II disputed the "easy" case against the
Code's flexibility-promoting rules. Once we account for the ex
ante effect that these rules have on the formation of relationship-
specific practices, it will generally not be the case that greater ri-
gidity will ensue. The law's attempt to enhance flexibility neither
promotes nor diminishes flexibility.
Like most irrelevance claims, this one is offered for the sake
of igniting an inquiry, not ending it. Is it really the case that the
law's flexibility-promoting erosion rules do not matter? The
analysis in this Part tries to respond to the challenge posed by
the irrelevance claim. It takes a closer look at the assumptions
under which the irrelevance result was obtained and explores
whether the result breaks down when we relax these assump-
tions. In light of the insight that the cost of enforcement is the
only factor that potentially affects deviation from a formal enti-
tlement, the analysis here focuses on this factor. That is, knowing
that the substantive erosion mechanism embodied in the law's
flexibility-promoting doctrines is not, in itself, a determinative
factor, the remainder of this Part explores other subtle features
that can make these doctrines relevant. The analysis will exam-
ine patterns by which the flexibility-promoting doctrines affect
enforcement costs, thereby indirectly affecting the value of the
entitlement. In so doing, the analysis will resurrect the conjecture
that flexibility-promoting erosion rules are undesirable, but will
offer different, more tentative, grounds upon which this conjec-
ture can be based."
A. Retrospective Suits
A critical assumption underlying the irrelevance claim is
that a promisee must enforce against breach immediately. In the
multi-period dealing, each violation had to be redressed by a
separate enforcement effort, and a rightholder was assumed to be
unable to enforce in the end period for recovery of all past
breaches. This assumption does not accurately reflect reality or
the law governing repeat transactions. Often, contractual promis-
70 The analysis in Part III, while offering a variety of sources that could lead to the fal-
sification of the irrelevance claim, does not cover all potential sources. Being exploratory
in nature, it seeks to highlight some-albeit not all-relevant issues that might arise in
commercial transactions and which the analysis in Part II overlooked. For additional fal-
sifying sources, see Ian Ayres, Eroding Entitlements as Litigation Commitment, 66 U Chi
L Rev 836 (1999), and Richard A. Epstein, Confusion about Custom: Disentangling Infor-
mal Customs from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U Chi L Rev 821, 830-31 (1999).
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ees may be permitted to accumulate causes of action and-subject
to the statute of limitations-enforce at one time their rights ret-
rospectively against all past breaches.71 However, the power of
parties to accumulate causes of action throughout the limitations
period, and thereby economize on enforcement costs, depends to a
large extent on whether the law incorporates an erosion rule.
Under the no-erosion regime, the promisee may plausibly wait
the full statutory limitation period and then seek retrospective
damages for all previous breaches. The promisee need not make
any affrmative act to delay enforcement. She may passively
await the accumulation of breaches. By doing so, she does not
sacrifice any past or prospective value. The cost of enforcement is
merely the cost of a one-time retrospective suit.
Under course of performance or waiver and modification
rules, however, the promisee cannot afford to be so passively pa-
tient. If she waits, she will see her prospective rights erode. Fur-
thermore, the doctrine of waiver may apply to prior, as well as
prospective, breaches. By failing to enforce, the promisee risks
not only the emergence of an adverse course of performance, but
she also risks that a court may hold that she has waived her
power to recover for the early breaches."2 Thus, the promisee's si-
lence diminishes the value to her of both past and subsequent
performance. She cannot afford to be silent and to patiently ac-
cumulate claims so as to economize on enforcement costs. And
since the irrelevance result suggests that the cost of enforcement
is the only factor that determines the overall magnitude of depar-
ture from the formal entitlement, erosion rules that lead to
greater enforcement costs could potentially lead to greater devia-
tions.
This last point needs to be carefully qualified. While it is true
that doctrines like course of performance and waiver imply that
the breached-against party cannot afford to passively accumulate
causes of action, it is not necessarily true that she must incur full
1 UCC § 2-725(1) asserts: "An action for breach of any contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued." Parties may reduce this
period to one year, but may not extend it.
72 See, for example, Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc v Bio-Zyme Enterprises, 625
SW2d 295, 298 (Tex 1982) (holding that course of conduct establishes a future obligation
and prevents recovery of past remedies); Southwest Industrial Import & Export, Inc v
Borneo Sumatra Trading Co, Inc, 666 SW2d 625, 628-29 (Tex App 1984) (finding that by
paying a higher demanded price for three shipments, the buyer waives her right to secure
the lower, previously agreed-upen price prospectively and cannot recover the price differ-
ence for the delivered goods). This approach also applies to installment contracts. A buyer
who accepts a nonconforming installment without seeking remedy loses the power to can-
cel the contract. See UCC § 2-612(3).
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enforcement costs each round. Under most versions of the Code's
erosion rules, erosion is not likely to occur if a party objects to, or
protests against, a pattern of violation as it begins to emerge. The
Code makes it explicit that by raising an objection to a noncon-
forming performance, a party can prevent the course of perform-
ance from becoming binding. 3 If a continuing nonconformity oc-
curs, the buyer can reserve the right to a full remedy by inform-
ing the seller that he rejects the tendered goods as nonconform-
ing.74 Courts have therefore consistently held that rights are
waived only when the breached-against party did not protest the
violation.75 This qualification makes obvious sense: namely, if one
party objects or protests, that indicates that the parties did not
mutually agree to deviate from the formal provisions and that the
other party's reliance on the violation is unreasonable. Thus, the
Code's erosion rules require greater enforcement effort, but the
magnitude of the difference-for example, the cost of verbal ob-
jections-may often be trivial. Still, the fact that parties time and
time again allow conflicting practices to develop without objecting
suggests that perhaps the cost of protest is not trivial, particu-
larly if it must be accompanied by an affinmative act of rejection
or if the violations are hard to detect.76
The effect of erosion rules can thus be determined only by
examining the enforcement measures they require. It is not the
substantive rate of erosion that matters, but the procedural way
in which erosion can be avoided. If the procedure is cheap-a
mere protest rather than a full-blown lawsuit-the entitlement
becomes less vulnerable, irrespective of the speed through which
past practices erode express terms. In general, though, the Code's
erosion rules do affect the type of enforcement measures that a
rightholder needs to take in order to protect her contractual
rights. Rules that incorporate a fast rate of erosion, like the
Code's waiver doctrine,77 might require not just more frequent but
also more costly measures of enforcement. Rightholders will have
UCC § 2-208(1) explains that course of performance will be inferred only if "acqui-
esced in without objection."
' UCC § 2-602 (setting forth criteria for effective rejection of goods); White and Sum-
mers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 8-3 at 305-07 (cited in note 25) (discussing cases
where objection was and was not effective).
" See Lancaster Glass Corp v Philips ECG, Inc, 835 F2d 652, 659-60 (6th Cir 1987)
(holding that course of performance applies only if the party did not object to the practice);
Southwest Industrial, 666 SW2d at 628 (noting that protesting a price increase suffices to
prevent waiver).
76 This issue is addressed in Part I1.C.1.
"See Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.5 at 588-90 (cited in note 19), for a description of the
"fondness" courts have shown for the waiver doctrine.
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a shorter period of time to acquire evidence about the breach,
which makes litigation more risky and costly. If they decide to
sue, they likely will incur greater litigation costs relative to a no-
erosion regime, in which they have more time to prepare.78 And,
as argued above, they will have to engage in these costly en-
forcement "rounds" more often than under a no-erosion rule. In
other words, enforcement costs are endogenous: their magnitude
is contingent on the legal erosion regime. The assumption un-
derlying the derivation of the irrelevance result-that the cost of
enforcement is fixed and denotes an exogenous attribute of the
system, independent of and unaffected by the substantive erosion
mechanism-is often false. Hence, erosion rules could have a po-
tentially significant effect on the magnitude of deviation from the
formal entitlement, but only to the extent that they influence the
effective cost of enforcement.
B. Acceleration Rules
The argument that the two effects arising out of erosion
rules-the flexibility effect and the rigidity effect-are of equal
magnitude is true only within a specific "family" of rules. To dem-
onstrate their potential imbalance, that is, to recognize situations
in which the irrelevance claim fails on its own terms, consider the
following hypothetical (admittedly extreme) erosion rule. Suppose
that in the event of any nonconforming tender, minuscule as it
might be, the promisee will not only lose the power to enforce the
limited contractual right that has just been breached, but will
also lose all of her other, unviolated, contractual rights. The
promisor will be fully and unilaterally discharged of all his con-
tractual duties. This harsh and draconian result might seem to be
devastating to the promisee, but in fact-and counter-intuitive-
ly-it operates to the promisee's advantage. Within the frame-
work developed above, such an extreme erosion regime reinforces
the rigidity effect, bolstering the credibility of the promisee's
threat to sue and thus deterring even the smallest of breaches. A
promisee who might otherwise be saddled by high enforcement
costs, and therefore be vulnerable to opportunism, will instead, as
" The need to incur higher litigation costs under erosion regimes can be attributed to
two distinct sources. First, having less time to prepare a suit, the plaintiff cannot be as
thrifty and selective in producing evidence. Second, erosion rules put more at stake and
therefore, in similar spirit to an argument made with respect to the British rule of fee
shifting, lead parties to invest more in winning. See Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand
for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J L Econ & Org 143, 156-64 (1987)
(arguing that an English fee shifting rule encourages litigants to spend more on a case).
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a result of her increased stakes, enjoy an unscathed, unchal-
lenged entitlement. 9
This hypothetical erosion rule illustrates the more general
case in which erosion is accelerated.' ° The irrelevance claim does
not apply to accelerated erosion rules. It only applies to erosion
rules under which the legal duty at any given stage is a continu-
ous function of the explicit promise and the actual performance
rendered in past rounds. If, instead, the buyer's nonconformance
creates a legal duty that departs from this formula (as, say, when
the duty collapses to zero after any minor breach), the irrelevance
claim fails.
Some of the Code's past practices doctrines can plausibly be
classified as accelerated erosion rules. Most notably, the Code's
course of dealings rule might lead to acceleration in the following
way. If, by allowing a conflicting practice to develop within an
ongoing relationship, a party sacrifices value in future transac-
tions, the compounded loss may be so severe that it sufficiently
strengthens the rigidity effect, leading the party to prohibit any
deviations. This acceleration effect could be dramatic if a con-
flicting practice within one relationship were to have erosion
power within other ongoing or future relationships with different
parties. Although the Code restricts the course of dealings doc-
trine to practices formed between the same parties in their past
interactions,"' the usage of trade erosion doctrine could achieve
this result within a close-knit industry."2
C. Imperfect Information
An assumption of perfect information underlay the argument
that the Code's flexibility rules are irrelevant in determining ex-
The promisee unambiguously benefits from the extreme erosion rule only if detec-
tion of violation is perfect. The problem of imperfect detection will be addressed in Part
III.C.
sa The term "acceleration" is used here differently than when describing the commonly
found contractual "acceleration clauses." Contractual acceleration clauses usually stipu-
late that any breach by the promisor will eliminate some of the promisor's contractual
rights (for example, his right to graduate the payment of debt). In the current context,
however, acceleration refers to situations in which any breach by the promisor, if acqui-
esced to by the promisee, would eliminate some of the promisee's other contractual rights.
"I UCC § 1-205(1) ("A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction."). See also James J. White and Robert S. Summers, 1
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-3 at 122 (West 3d ed 1988) ("Section 1-205, however, is a
provision that purports to deal only with rights between the original parties.").
"This argument is well-made by Ian Ayres in his comment to this Article, where he
argues that a monopolist's acquiescence to violations by some small consumers might gen-
erate a trade usage that erodes the monopolist's rights against the rest of the market. See
Ayres, 66 U Chi L Rev at 837-38 (cited in note 70).
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actly how flexible formal contractual entitlements are. The
promisee, being able to perfectly monitor performance and fear-
ing that her future rights would erode if she permitted a con-
flicting practice to develop, was able to adjust her tolerance
threshold according to the legal rule. Similarly, the promisor,
knowing precisely whether or not any given breach would trigger
enforcement, was able to stretch the limits of the promisee's tol-
erance and commit an opportunistic breach that went unenforced,
thereby establishing a '"mildly" conflicting practice. These as-
sumptions regarding the parties' knowledge are unrealistic. In
the analysis below, they will be separated and relaxed, thus ena-
bling us to examine whether, in environments of imperfect infor-
mation, erosion rules make a difference.
1. Imperfect monitoring.
The rigidity effect of the course of performance doctrine and
its cohorts requires the promisee to know that her contractual
right is being violated. However, some violations may go unde-
tected. Promisees may be unable or unwilling to constantly moni-
tor the quality of performance and might therefore fail to detect
an ongoing practice of breach. Thus, an erosion rule will not cre-
ate additional motivation for the promisee to enforce her rights,
and the rigidity effect will vanish. Consequently, promisors will
be less inhibited than they otherwise might be from deviating
from the formal provisions of the contract. In these circum-
stances, the course of performance rule will lead to greater devia-
tions from the formal right than a no-erosion rule. The course of
performance rule will result in only the flexibility effect without
the counter-balancing rigidity effect. The Code conditions the
binding force of nonconforming practices on the breached-against
party's ability to detect and protest nonconforming practices;' the
breached-against party must exercise a reasonable detection ef-
fort to preserve her remedy.
The problem of imperfect detection is particularly acute in
those contracts where it is hard to ascertain whether or not ten-
der is conforming. As described by Lisa Bernstein in her contribu-
tion to this Symposium, standards of adequate performance are
"See, for example, UCC § 2-208(1), which conditions the finding of course of perform-
ance on the promisee's "opportunity for objection." An undetectable violation normally will
not provide an opportunity for objection. See also UCC § 2-602(1), which provides that a
buyer loses the right to reject nonconforming tender after a reasonable time. The commen-
tary, statutory history, and case law suggest that the difficulty of discovering the defect is
relevant to determining whether the rejection was within a reasonable time. White and
Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 8-3 at 305-08 (cited in note 25).
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often dictated by a custom or a relationship-specific norm that re-
flects the difficulty of achieving perfect tender." Here, the prom-
isee can detect any nonconformity but cannot detect whether it
results from opportunistic behavior-something about which she
should be concerned-or from random, inadvertent effects that
will wash out over time. By acquiescing to repeated nonconform-
ity, even of the customary type, a court may deem that the prom-
isee has acquiesced to a contract-modifying course of perform-
ance. Thus, the rigidity effect implies that when perfect tender is
difficult to achieve, promisees might be less tolerant of noncon-
formity, and the customary zone of permissible deviations will
shrink. Uncertainty, therefore, leads to excessive "precautions"
against erosion and diminishes the parties' ability to flexibly per-
form their contractual obligations.'
These conclusions regarding the effects of the promisee's un-
certainty can be rephrased in a somewhat more cautious tone.
When it is difficult for the promisee to detect nonconformity, her
incentives to invest in monitoring may increase." It might be the
case, for example, that with a sufficiently high expenditure on
monitoring, the promisee would detect every breach and the same
amount of rigidity will result; the only difference between the re-
gimes would be the cost spent on monitoring. By making the fail-
ure to detect breach more costly, a course-of-performance type
rule will induce more expenditure on monitoring. Thus, one way
or another, when the promisee has imperfect detection ability,
she will be unambiguously worse off under the Code's erosion
rules. The erosion rules will inflict either a greater cost of moni-
toring or a greater, undesirable flexibility in the contractual
rights.
Bernstein, 66 U Chi L Rev at 752 (cited in note 7).
"Overprecaution is a familiar result of the actor's uncertainty. See, for example,
Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 79-83 (cited in note 10) (arguing that a
general consequence of uncertainty over the assessment of true levels of care is that par-
ties will tend to take more than due care).
"It is by now standard in the law and economics literature to tackle problems of im-
perfect information by examining the incentives to obtain information. See, for example,
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante
Legal Advice, 8 J L Econ & Org 306, 308-12 (1992) (comparing effects of strict liability and
negligence regimes on incentives to obtain ex ante legal advice); Steven Shavell, Liability
and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk, 21 J Legal Stud 259 (1992) (examin-
ing the incentives that the prospect of liability creates for potential injurers to obtain in-
formation about risk); Guido Calabresi and Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests of Liability in
Torts, 14 J Legal Stud 585, 621-23 (1985) (discussing incentives to acquire new informa-
tion under four possible bases for liability in products liability suits).
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2. Randomness and imprecision in adjudication.
When parties dispute remedies for violations, a tribunal's
resolution process may include a random component. Random-
ness may arise from errors in measuring facts, such as the mag-
nitude or prevalence of breach. Randomness also develops out of
the legal position that the court will take, that is, what threshold
it will set for past practices to become binding.' Since the past
practices doctrines are formulated not as bright line rules but as
vague standards, courts have substantial freedom in the content
they give these doctrines. Even if courts do not make systematic
errors or have systematic biases, they may consistently arrive at
factual determinations that are "surprising" and legal determina-
tions that are difficult to predict.'
Under a no-erosion regime, a risk-neutral promisee is indif-
ferent with respect to random errors regarding the measurement
of performance. These errors may benefit her or harm her in
equal degrees. The errors have no effect on future performance
since performance standards are not subject to erosion. Thus,
even if known to occur, the ex post randomness or imprecision of
a court's decision will not affect the promisee's ex ante incentives
to enforce the promisor's obligations, as analyzed in Part I.89
However, under the Code's erosion regime, favorable and unfa-
vorable errors-as well as randomness in adjudicating stan-
dards-do not wash out. Unfavorable errors, such as overesti-
mating the number of times that breach has occurred or setting
an abnormally lenient threshold for what constitutes a binding
practice, are not offset by symmetrically favorable errors. If the
promisee is acting rationally and times the enforcement actions
promptly so as to preempt erosion, she can only lose from random
adjudication errors. Unfavorable errors would lead to unantici-
pated erosion, whereas favorable errors would have no effect. As
a result, the promisee will have to exercise greater caution in
timing the enforcement actions.'
In applying the UCC's course of performance and course of dealing rules, different
courts have taken different stands as to what amounts to a binding practice and as to
whether the practice can trump an explicit contractual provision. See White and Sum-
mers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 1-6 at 34-37, § 3-3 at 92-96 (cited in note 25).
" See Louis Kaplow, The Value ofAccuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23
J Legal Stud 307, 328-29 (1994) (arguing that the element of randomness in court deci-
sions makes it very difficult ex ante for parties to predict how courts will resolve their dis-
pute).
See Part II.B.2.
,This argument is similar to the familiar argument that courts' random errors in set-
ting standards of due care affect injurers adversely. See, for example, Richard Craswell
and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J L Econ & Org 279, 280
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Thus, randomness in the administration of the law will re-
quire greater enforcement effort on the part of the promisee and
will therefore make the promisee worse off under an erosion re-
gime. Rules like course of performance and waiver are more likely
to be administered with error or with a random element. While a
simple no-erosion rule only requires courts to make a factual de-
termination as to the magnitude of breach or to aggregate the
cumulative cost of a sequence of breaches,9 erosion rules require
courts to examine the parties' past practices and establish a
wider set of facts. That is, erosion rules require courts to make
not only the factual determination regarding the nature of the
past practices, but also the legal determination whether these
past practices have been sufficiently immanent that they consti-
tute a binding norm.92 It is this legal determination that is diffi-
cult for parties to predict. This compounded uncertainty, coupled
with the asymmetric cost of error, imposes a greater loss of value
on the promisee. More deviations from the formal provisions will
be authorized by couts. Some will reflect genuine conflicting
practices and thus serve the interest of flexibility. Others will re-
flect judgment errors and biases and not serve any goal of flexi-
bility; instead, they will merely effect an ex post value transfer.
Once again, uncertainty makes promisees unambiguously worse
off under the erosion regime.
D. The Cost of Breach
The analysis has thus far assumed that the promisee has a
commensurable interest in strict performance of explicit contrac-
tual provisions and that any deviation from the express contract
terms would be costly to her. Often, however, the cost to the
promisee of nonconforming performance is negligible. Perhaps
the pecuniary cost of the nonconformity is minuscule, especially if
it is balanced by a corresponding adjustment of the promisee's
duties. Or, perhaps the nonconformity is subsequently cured by
(1986) (contending that actors' uncertainty concerning what constitutes a violation may
lead to excessive precaution).
" This administrability advantage is a familiar advantage of more formalistic regimes.
See, for example, Schauer, 97 Yale L J at 539 (cited in note 2) (citing predictability as one
benefit of a formal interpretation of rules); Hart, The Concept of Law at 126 (cited in note
3) (stating that one characteristic of formal decisionmaking is that it secures "a measure of
certainty").
"The added complexity associated with adjudicating erosion rules, relative to no-
erosion rules, is an illustration of the familiar argument that standards will generally lead
to less predictability than bright line rules. See, for example, Kaplow, 23 J Legal Stud at
325-30 (cited in note 88) (acknowledging that people may find rules more predictable ex
ante).
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the promisor. Oftentimes, the parties might entertain "relational"
norms, according to which perceptions of pettiness are damag-
ing. 3 In such cases, the promisee may care little about the actual
deviation, as it occurs, and will have little desire to seek redress.
This indifference is often evidenced by creditors' reluctance to use
minor debt defaults as triggers for acceleration or termination
clauses.94 However, while it is often the case that the promisee
cares little about the instantaneous loss of value as a result of
nonconformity, she may care a great deal about preserving the
formal entitlement; she may therefore avoid waiving or modifying
the entitlement through acquiescence. Maintaining the formal
provisions that allow the promisee to seek remedies for noncon-
formity is valuable to her as, for example, a protective measure in
future contingencies when the promisor's efforts to cure noncon-
formity will not be as valuable,95 or when the promisor might be-
come opportunistic or financially distressed. These formal con-
tractual provisions will not be utilized when the relationship is
valuable, but they are secured as termination devices for circum-
stances where the promisee will no longer gain from preserving
the relationship.96
Still, facing an otherwise negligible breach, the promisee's
incentives to react depend on the law's erosion rule. Under no-
erosion regimes, the promisee will usually ignore such harmless
deviations. The law provides the rigidity, thereby allowing the
promisee to behave flexibly, in adherence with the relational
"That is, acquiescent behavior generates "goodwill.' See, for example, Richard E.
Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw U L
Rev 369, 400-04 (1981) (asserting that nonnandated price adjustments and other forms of
flexibility and cooperation are essential to the viability of a long-term contract); Victor P.
Goldberg and John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts:
A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J L & Econ 369, 390 (1987) (citing suppliers' voluntary
price reduction for petroleum coke as evidence of the importance of flexibility in long-term
contracts).
" One area in which this phenomenon is prominent is mortgage contracts. Virtually
all mortgages contain an acceleration clause that can be triggered after any minor default.
See Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.1 (ALI 1997); R. Wilson Freyermuth,
Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 BYU L Rev
1035, 1035-36. However, in the vast majority of cases, these provisions are not applied.
See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 Mich L
Rev 159, 174 (1997) (demonstrating the high likelihood that payment defaults will go un-
challenged by creditors interested in maintaining relationships).
"UCO § 2-508(2) provides the seller with the opportunity to cure nonconformity that
the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable, but that the buyer has
rejected. As comment 2 explains, course of performance and course of dealings can provide
such grounds.
See Mann, 96 Mich L Rev at 188 (cited in note 94) (finding that the most common
reason for terminating a lending relationship was "general concern about the ongoing fi-
nancial stability of the debtor or its assets," not failure to make some payments).
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norms of cooperation.' Under an erosion regime, however, the
promisee will face greater urgency to react. Acquiescence might
be costly in the future, as it erodes a contractual provision that
might have significant value in certain future contingencies.
True, the promisee can avoid erosion by issuing repeated objec-
tions to prevent her acquiescence from being inferred. But every
such objection is costly, both because it involves a transaction
cost and because it reflects an attitude that conflicts with the
norms and standards of conduct that are expected to govern
within relational contracts." Since the law does not provide the
desired level of rigidity, the promisee must do so, and at a greater
cost than if the law did provide it.
This discussion could be interpreted to suggest that the criti-
cal assumption underlying the irrelevance claim is that parties
behave in strict accordance with the self-promoting opportunistic
posture, and thus that the claim is false when the assumption is
replaced with the relational contract behavioral vision. While this
interpretation may be plausible-in relational-cooperative con-
texts performance is not determined by balancing threats-it is
too strong and not necessary. An alternative interpretation would
not require a reassessment of the underlying rational behavioral
posture in order to falsify the irrelevance claim. It would simply
argue that the analysis in Part II assumed that the only cost that
the promisee faces as a result of breach is the incremental income
value deprived by subperformance (the cost of each additional
day of delay in payment). But the promisee enjoys her formal con-
tractual right not merely as a means to satisfy her endless appe-
tite for punctual income flows, but also for the "stock" value of the
right-the one-time value it could generate in some future con-
tingency. Formal acceleration clauses usually have such stock
value: namely, they have no current yield, only a value at "liqui-
dation" of the relationship. Under the erosion regime, acquies-
cence to breach is costlier because it jeopardizes this stock value.
To avoid this increased cost, the promisee will need to invest
more in enforcement.99 This imposes a greater burden on the
Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract:An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Rela-
tions 40-59 (Yale 1980) (describing how cooperation arises in long-term contractual rela-
tionships, and highlighting the role of norms like mutuality and flexibility).
Id.
A similar interplay between the income flow and the stock value of entitlements
arises under another prominent erosion rule: adverse possession in property law. A land
asset provides its owner with both an "income flow" (continuous use) and a "stock value"
(resale price). When the owner cares merely about the stock value, and does not use her
land for income purposes, she is worse off under the adverse possession rule because it re-
quires more frequent eviction acts.
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promisee and will diminish her tolerance towards otherwise
harmless nonconformities.
E. Reliance
We saw at the outset that one of the principal justifications
for the Code's flexibility-promoting erosion regime is reliance.' 0
As the argument went, when practices that conflict with the con-
tract develop, one of the parties may rely on the conflicting prac-
tices. To protect this reliance interest, erosion doctrines trans-
form the practice into a source of binding obligations. The prob-
lem with this ordinary understanding of the reliance rationale is
that it views reliance as a condition for erosion rules to kick in,
not as a result of the rules' application. That is, reliance on an
ongoing practice is perceived as a "circumstance" that courts
should identify before applying the erosion rule. The existence of
reliance or lack thereof is independent of the law. 1 In reality,
reliance is potentially induced by erosion rules: parties may be
more likely to rely on a conflicting practice if they know that their
reliance will increase the likelihood that courts will deem the
practice to be binding.'02 Thus, while the need to accommodate ac-
tions made in reliance on a conflicting practice is one of the prin-
cipal reasons to prefer a flexible legal regime over a rigid one, the
mere implementation of such a flexible regime gives rise to reli-
ance actions that might otherwise not take place.
However, reliance may not always be a bootstrapping act, in-
tended to reinforce erosion of an opponent's rights.0 It is often a
product of sincere uncertainty as to the formal boundaries of
rights. A myopic party may rely on a conflicting practice, such as
price reduction or late tender, not for the purpose of modifying
the contract prospectively in a manner favorable to herself, but
out of sincere belief that the practice reflects a status quo. It is
still plausible to argue, though, that erosion rules will lead to an
enhanced tendency among parties to incur such "sincere" reliance
costs. In the absence of waiver and modification doctrines and the
like, an investing party faces a greater chance that her reliance
'"See text accompanying notes 31-32.
o ' See UCC § 2-209(5) (stating that a party may retract a waiver "unless the retraction
would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver"); Trad
Industries, Ltd v Brogan, 246 Mont 439, 805 P2d 54, 59 (1991) (treating oral modification
as binding because of reliance).
'"See Wisconsin Knife Works v National Metal Crafters, 781 F2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir
1986) (opinion by Posner) (acknowledging the possibility that a party will incur a reliance
cost in order to reinforce a claim that oral modification should be binding).
'"Id.
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costs will be forfeited or appropriated by the other party. Thus,
erosion rules encourage cautious parties' reliance. The desirabil-
ity of erosion rules will turn, therefore, on the desirability of the
parties' reliance investments. Inasmuch as these investments
have private, rent-extracting value and no social value, the case
against them is reinforced. Erosion rules can be defended only if
the reliance they generate is value creating and not merely value
transferring.
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CONCLUSION AND A METHODOLOGICAL CLARIFICATION
This Article began by arguing that the doctrines that epito-
mize the Code's antiformalist approach are irrelevant. When ex-
amined through the lens of incentive analysis, these doctrines do
not facilitate, nor do they forestall, flexible modifications of for-
mal provisions of the contract. This benchmark argument dis-
puted both the traditional justifications for the Code's approach,
as well as some of its most prominent criticisms. The analysis
then shifted to examine why the irrelevance claim is false and
fleshed out some factors that can make the Code's erosion rules
relevant. In this manner, it resurrected some of the same criti-
cisms of the Code that it previously disputed. At the end of the
day, one might question the value of this exposition technique.
Why highlight a proposition that is known to be false? Why exert
the effort of demonstrating its abstract validity, if this validity is
founded on simplifying assumptions that are later relaxed and
shown to be both crucial to the proof and empirically unrealistic?
In meticulously deriving the benchmark irrelevance proposi-
tion, the analysis did not intend to convince the readers, but to
challenge them. It asked the readers to carefully examine re-
ceived intuitions. And, by showing that the relaxation of some
underlying assumptions refutes the proposition, the analysis did
not intend to resolve this challenge, but to sharpen it. The irrele-
vance claim may not survive the scrutiny of changed assump-
tions, but its methodological contribution remains. Namely, it ar-
gues for a renewed agenda for the inquiry into the Code's flexi-
bility doctrines. It suggests that the significance of these rules
and their ability to promote or stifle flexibility in commercial re-
lations cannot be attributed simply to their substantive erosion
mechanisms. If these rules are to have any effect, it must be at-
tributed to one of the underlying enforcement-related features
that the irrelevance claim assumed away. Thus, whether the
"For an analysis distinguishing between efficient and inefficient reliance in this con-
text, see Ben-Shahar and Katz, Reliance on Non-Enforcement (cited in note 32).
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Code promotes flexibility (as its drafters hoped) or rigidity (as,
Bernstein, for example, has argued'05) cannot be determined
solely by pointing to its erosion mechanisms, as previous writers
have assumed. This analysis demonstrated that those mecha-
nisms are neutral.
The flexibility versus rigidity debate should be resolved by
the more subtle factors that determine which rule makes it cost-
lier for rightholders to enforce compliance with their entitle-
ments.' ° A host of factors were shown to affect the enforcement
process: rules allowing parties to accumulate causes of action, in-
formation structures and monitoring incentives, the prospects of
a long-term relationship with the breacher, and more. By and
large, these factors demonstrate why parties generally dislike the
Code's immanent law approach. Hence, inasmuch as this Article
confirmed some previously voiced conjectures, the conjectures
were corroborated on a different foundation.
The analysis in this Article was staged within the context of
a particular debate in commercial law, but it may potentially il-
luminate the broader debate over flexibility in the law.' 7 Erosion
rules, which allow realities to override formal allocations of enti-
tlements, exist outside the Uniform Commercial Code in a multi-
tude of legal areas. Private law doctrines like adverse possession
and abandonment, procedural doctrines like estoppel and res ju-
dicata, public law doctrines like desuetude and delay, interna-
tional law doctrines like prescription, and various others all in-
corporate one position or another about whether the failure to en-
force in the presence of ongoing violations of the entitlement
might lead to the "decay" or expiration of the formal entitlement.
" Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1808 (cited in note 8).
'"This methodological paradigm is familiar from well-known (and far more important)
invariance results that economic analysis has produced. The Coase Theorem, for example,
is understood to suggest that any effect the allocation of legal rights may have on aggre-
gate surplus must be attributed not to substantive rules, but to transaction costs. See
David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in Newman, ed, 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics and the Law at 270-71 (cited in note 60). Similarly the Modigliani-Miller Theorem
is interpreted to suggest that any effect the corporate dividend policy and capital structure
may have on the value of the firm must be attributed to the theorem's underlying assump-
tions regarding information and contracting costs. See James A. Brickley and John J.
McConnell, Dividend Policy, in John Eatwell, et al, eds, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of
Economics 896, 896-97 (Stockton 1989). Similarly, Barro's Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
is understood to suggest that the extent to which the government's tax versus debt fi-
nancing policy affects household wealth depends not on the debt and tax policy per se but
on market frictions and information factors. See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds
Net Wealth?, 82 J Pol Econ 1095 (1974).
"An exploration of the various applications of this approach is pursued in Ben-
Shahar, 1 Am L & Econ Rev (forthcoming 1999) (cited in note 20).
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These doctrines, scattered throughout the law, all share the
pragmatist spirii that the life conditions of time and place should
be taken into account in allocating entitlements, and that these
life conditions should conceivably be powerful enough to flex for-
mal allocations. Thus, the insights developed in this Article apply
within the broader family of erosion rules. Specifically, the analy-
sis suggests that legal rules that purport to follow the reality of
the entitlement over its formality might have a lesser impact
than previously thought. True, these rules are better fitted to en-
act an image of reality, but at the same time they also rigidify re-
ality. Flexibility doctrines influence and reshape the same reality
that they subsequently reflect. If such "reality-reflecting" doc-
trines are to have an impact on society, their impact must be
traced not to the substantive flexible arrangements that they in-
corporate, but to the subtle effects they might deliberately or in-
advertently have on the enforcement process.
